

1154. Witness AWE attended only one meeting at Rwamagana and knew of no other MRND meeting held there.¹²³² The only persons he could recall attending were Gabriel Mbaryehe, Rose Karushara, and Odette Nyirabaganzi.¹²³³

1155. In a broadcast on Radio Rwanda in February 1994, it was stated that an MRND rally had been held in Rwamagana, but Mathieu Ngirumpatse was unable to attend because he was meeting with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General.¹²³⁴ Speeches of Ferdinand Kabegema and Edouard Karemera were reported. There were no references to Inyenzi or Tutsi.¹²³⁵

1156. Witness AWE claimed that politicians' speeches included the words Tutsi and Inkotanyi in every three sentences, and that the person recording the speech made a selection because they did not want the international community to know that they were saying the Tutsi was the enemy.¹²³⁶ A person who did not delete such references from a recording would be severely punished because the recording would be heard by the international community.¹²³⁷

- b. Defence evidence
 - ii. Nzirorera case

1157. **Joseph Nzirorera** will testify that he never attended any MRND rally in Rwamagana.

- 3. January 1994 Allegations by Jean Pierre Turatsinze
 - a. Prosecution evidence

¹²³² Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 33

¹²³³ Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 33

¹²³⁴ Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 35; Exhibit DNZ-311

¹²³⁵ Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 36-37; Exhibit DNZ-311

¹²³⁶ Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 37

¹²³⁷ Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 38

i. Frank Claeys

1158. On 9 January 1994, in a broadcast over Radio Rwanda, Anastase Gasana, MDR Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that “our political parties are also informed of the lugubrious plan to physically eliminate the main opponents of the Habyarimana regime, which plan is to be implemented by the 1,700 *Interahamwe*, who are the MRND militia and who have been trained and armed for that purpose. They have just been unleashed in all the neighbourhoods of Kigali city.” This figure of 1700 was the same that Jean Pierre Turatsinze provided to UNAMIR on 10 January.¹²³⁸

1159. On 10 January 1994, General Dallaire asked Claeys and Captain Amadou Deme of Senegal to get in contact with Prime Minister Designate Faustin Twagiramungu, who would put them in touch with someone who had information to give.¹²³⁹ They went to the office of Twagiramungu, who provided them with the name and phone number of the person to contact.¹²⁴⁰

1160. Thus, the informant came to UNAMIR through the political opponents of the MRND, rather than just reporting his information directly to a law enforcement agency.¹²⁴¹

1161. They went back to UNAMIR headquarters and called the informant, whose name was Jean Pierre Turatsinze. They arranged to meet that evening at the parking lot of the Kigali Nights nightclub. They picked Turatsinze up that evening and drove him to the Belgian contingent headquarters.¹²⁴²

¹²³⁸ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 17; Exhibit DNZ-204

¹²³⁹ Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 47

¹²⁴⁰ Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 47

¹²⁴¹ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 19

¹²⁴² Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 48

1162. Turatsinze never said there was any plan to kill Belgian soldiers. He only speculated that this might have occurred if certain events had taken place. The Belgian contingent of UNAMIR never took any special precautions based upon this information.¹²⁴³ Claeys never heard of any plans to kill Belgian soldiers while he was in Rwanda.¹²⁴⁴

1163. Turatsinze later told Claeys that the MRND leaders had changed their attitudes towards the Belgians and believed they were not bad-intended.¹²⁴⁵ In a meeting with Booh Booh in early February, the MRND party leaders urged UNAMIR to proceed with the recovery of illegal arms throughout the country so as to ensure a peaceful and secure environment.¹²⁴⁶ Also in early February, General Dallaire reported a major change in the attitude of authorities such as the MRND Minister of Defence, MRND Minister of Interior, Army Chief of Staff, and Prefet of Kigali, who were now publicly calling for confiscation of weapons by UNAMIR and the gendamerie.¹²⁴⁷

1164. Claeys had never experienced any hostility towards him during his stay in Kigali.¹²⁴⁸

1165. The Belgian soldiers who were killed on 7 April 1994 were not killed by Interahamwe.¹²⁴⁹

1166. Turatsinze claimed to be a former member of the President. Claeys understood he had been a member of the Presidential Guard, although Turatsinze did not

¹²⁴³ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 35

¹²⁴⁴ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 39

¹²⁴⁵ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 35

¹²⁴⁶ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 36; Exhibit DNZ-205

¹²⁴⁷ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 38; Exhibit DNZ-206

¹²⁴⁸ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 56; Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 39

¹²⁴⁹ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 39-40

use the term "Presidential Guard."¹²⁵⁰ He claimed to be paid 150,000 RWF per month as a wage. It was a huge wage in Rwanda, amounting to around E 2,000.¹²⁵¹

1167. Turatsinze said he had a direct link to the President of the MRND, although he did not give any detail about financial support.¹²⁵²

1168. Turatsinze said that the Interahamwe had trained 1700 men in RGF military camps outside the capital. They were scattered in groups of 40 throughout Kigali. Since UNAMIR deployed, he had trained 300 men in three week training sessions at RGF camps. Turatsinze was very convincing and appeared to be familiar with military terms. He claimed to have been trained in Egypt.¹²⁵³

1169. Turatsinze said that since UNAMIR's mandate, he had been ordered to make an inventory of the houses of all Tutsi in Kigali. The inventory was still in process and therefore he could not give a copy to UNAMIR. Turatsinze said he suspects it is for their extermination. He also said his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis in 20 minutes.¹²⁵⁴

1170. Claeys had no information concerning the existence of such lists prior to meeting Turatsinze or after meeting Turatsinze.¹²⁵⁵ Turatsinze told them that he "suspects" the lists are for the extermination of Tutsis. He had apparently never been explicitly told this explicitly by MRND leaders.¹²⁵⁶ Turatsinze had apparently never been instructed to train Interahamwe to exterminate Tutsis.¹²⁵⁷ Turatsinze never told Claeys that Interahamwe had been trained in such things as how to approach houses in the

¹²⁵⁰ Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 60

¹²⁵¹ Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 61

¹²⁵² Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 62

¹²⁵³ Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 64; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 5

¹²⁵⁴ Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 65; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 6

¹²⁵⁵ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 2, 31

¹²⁵⁶ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16

¹²⁵⁷ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16

middle of the night, how to enter locked premises, or how to neutralize the head of the household.¹²⁵⁸

1171. Turatsinze never showed UNAMIR these lists. They asked him for these lists at every meeting, and Turatsinze always responded, "Where is my security?"¹²⁵⁹

1172. Claeys understood Turatsinze to be saying that since he had people in 40 sections of Kigali, they could be deployed to enter houses of Tutsi during the night and kill 1000 in 20 minutes. Turatsinze said he did not want to be involved in killings of innocent Tutsi.¹²⁶⁰ Claeys understood Turatsinze to say that President Habyarimana was not aware of the numbers or activities that he had disclosed during the interview.¹²⁶¹

1173. After 6 April, Tutsis in Rwanda were not killed by trained Interahamwe with firearms invading their houses at the rate of 1000 Tutsis in 20 minutes, but were killed by a combination of youth wing members from several parties, soldiers, and members of the population at roadblocks, in their home, and at places of refuge.¹²⁶²

1174. Turatsinze said that he could provide the location of a major weapons cache with at least 135 weapons and that he had already distributed 110 weapons, including 35 with ammunition and can give details on their location. He was ready to go to the arms cache that night if he could be guaranteed protection for himself, his wife, and four children. He wanted safe haven in an embassy and then political asylum in another country.¹²⁶³

¹²⁵⁸ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16

¹²⁵⁹ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 31

¹²⁶⁰ Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 66

¹²⁶¹ Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 67; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 7

¹²⁶² Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 40

¹²⁶³ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 2

1175. Claeys was not aware that Turatsinze had sold a large number of weapons earmarked for the *Interahamwe* to a Burundian organisation known as FRODEBU and had pocketed the money.¹²⁶⁴ It is possible that this might explain why Turatsinze was asking UNAMIR for protection and not for money.¹²⁶⁵

1176. Dallaire stated that he had reservations of the suddenness of Turatsinze's change of heart to come clean with this information and could not fully exclude the possibility of a trap and a set up.¹²⁶⁶

1177. Claeys believed the information was too precise to be untrue, but it needed some verification. The fax was sent to New York in the early morning hours of 11 January 1994. He was informed that New York did not give any authorization for any action to recover weapons at the sites earmarked by the informant.¹²⁶⁷ The UN headquarters, in their response, noted that there were inconsistencies in the information provided by the informant.¹²⁶⁸

1178. The information provided by Turatsinze was being treated with caution at all levels of the UN.¹²⁶⁹

1179. They never attempted to verify the information provided by Turatsinze before forwarding it to UN headquarters.¹²⁷⁰ It was never subjected to rigorous intelligence analysis because UNAMIR, as a Chapter Six UN mission, was not authorized or equipped to conduct intelligence analysis.¹²⁷¹

¹²⁶⁴ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16

¹²⁶⁵ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 32

¹²⁶⁶ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 4; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 11

¹²⁶⁷ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 5

¹²⁶⁸ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23; Exhibit P39

¹²⁶⁹ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23

¹²⁷⁰ Transcript of 23 November 2006 @ 10

¹²⁷¹ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 43

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1180. The second time he met Turatsinze was on the evening of 12 January 1994. Turatsinze explained that he was late for the meeting because he had been with the MRND President who had urged Turatsinze to accelerate the distribution of weapons.¹²⁷²

1181. Turatsinze explained that he had already distributed weapons to the 25 secteur commanders, but that they had not distributed them to the lower levels. That would require an order from him. He also could order that the weapons be returned to him.¹²⁷³

1182. Turatsinze said he distributed weapons in his own car, a white sedan, as well as six minibuses belonging to the MRND or vehicles of the security services of the Army.¹²⁷⁴ He said that the weapons were moved every 5 or 6 days. He also said that grenades had been distributed a long time ago and that up to 60 Interahamwe per secteur should have 2-3 grenades each.¹²⁷⁵

1183. At the end of the meeting on 12 January, Turatsinze offered to prove his reliability by showing UNAMIR weapons which were stored at MRND headquarters.¹²⁷⁶ Claeys and Deme drove Turatsinze to the party headquarters. Claeys waited in the car while Turatsinze took Deme inside. When Deme returned, he said that he had seen 50 weapons in canvas bags with sealed boxes of ammunition in a shed on the property.¹²⁷⁷

1184. Turatsinze did not tell them on 10 January that the weapons were stored at the MRND headquarters.¹²⁷⁸ He told them there were 135 weapons on 10 January, and when he showed them the weapons on 12 January at the MRND headquarters, Captain

¹²⁷² Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 8

¹²⁷³ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 9; Exhibit P42 @ para. 4

¹²⁷⁴ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 9; Exhibit P42 @ para. 4

¹²⁷⁵ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 10; Exhibit P42 @ para. 4

¹²⁷⁶ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 11

¹²⁷⁷ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 11-12; Exhibit P42 @ para. 8

¹²⁷⁸ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23

Deme observed about 50. Turatsinze did not distribute any weapons between 10 and 12 January. Therefore it is possible that the 135 weapons were stored at some place other than the MRND headquarters.¹²⁷⁹

1185. Turatsinze had the ability to move weapons around, and had offered to move some of the weapons from his home to the MRND headquarters if UNAMIR was going to stage a raid there.¹²⁸⁰

1186. Turatsinze told Claeys that he was able to order the return of previously-distributed weapons to him. Turatsinze never told Claeys that on 11 January 1994, he had issued a communiqué over RTL M calling for an urgent meeting of the Interahamwe secteur Presidents to be held at MRND headquarters in Kimiruhura.¹²⁸¹

1187. For all Claeys knows, Turatsinze could have put the weapons at the MRND headquarters on the evening of 12 January before showing them to UNAMIR.¹²⁸² Claeys never determined that Ngirumpatse or Nzirorera were aware of the presence of weapons at MRND headquarters.¹²⁸³

1188. On 12 January, Turatsinze offered to provide them the next evening with license numbers of vehicles used for arms distribution and a few of the sites where arms caches are located.¹²⁸⁴

1189. On 13 January, in the afternoon, he attended a meeting between General Dallaire and the President and Secretary General of the MRND.¹²⁸⁵ The meeting was tape recorded, but the tape has not been located. At the meeting, Dallaire expressed his

¹²⁷⁹ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23-24

¹²⁸⁰ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 24; Exhibit P44

¹²⁸¹ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 24,30; Exhibit DNZ-242

¹²⁸² Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 30

¹²⁸³ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 31

¹²⁸⁴ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 12; Exhibit P42 @ para. 10

¹²⁸⁵ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 12

concern of weapons being possessed outside military barracks. The MRND officials denied knowledge of this.¹²⁸⁶

1190. Claeys did not know that there had been a meeting the day before between UNAMIR and the MRND leaders. For him it was the first time this concern was expressed to these people.¹²⁸⁷

1191. On the evening of 13 January, he and Deme again met with Turatsinze.¹²⁸⁸ He provided them with three license numbers of cars used to transport weapons. Turatsinze offered to move some weapons from his home to the MRND offices to increase the number of weapons there if they mounted an operation there.¹²⁸⁹

1192. Turatsinze said that most of the weapons he had were brand new. He said that only a few of the weapons he had distributed had magazines or ammunition and those distributed to the lower cells had no magazines.¹²⁹⁰ He said that the weapons distribution had begun about a month before (December).¹²⁹¹

1193. Turatsinze said he had a list of around 2000 Interahamwe, but he never provided or showed that list. He did show them three places where he said weapons were stored.¹²⁹² However, Claeys did not see weapons at these locations.¹²⁹³

1194. Turatsinze said that the MRND leaders had videotaped the meeting with General Dallaire and the meeting at UNAMIR the previous week. Claeys believed he was referring to the meeting where Dallaire and Booh Booh had gone to the MRND

¹²⁸⁶ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 17

¹²⁸⁷ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 17; Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 74

¹²⁸⁸ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 19

¹²⁸⁹ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 21; Exhibit P44

¹²⁹⁰ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 21

¹²⁹¹ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 22;

¹²⁹² Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 23

¹²⁹³ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 24

offices, and the meeting at which Claeys had been present. However, Claeys observed no taping equipment at the meeting he attended with the MRND leaders.¹²⁹⁴

1195. Turatsinze also told them on 20 January that he had distributed 9 of the weapons in a blue Pajero belonging to Prefet Renzaho. He also warned that the contractor of the works at CND, named Severa, would be killed soon.¹²⁹⁵ UNAMIR took no steps to warn Severa and had no information that he was ever killed.¹²⁹⁶

1196. Turatsinze also said that he had been told that a UNAMIR Colonel had driven a bus of PL members to the CND on 5 January. To Claeys' knowledge, nobody in UNAMIR was involved in driving a bus with PL members to the CND.¹²⁹⁷

1197. Turatsinze also said that UNAMIR had three minibuses on standby to evacuate its Tutsi employees if necessary. Claeys was not aware of such measures ever being prepared.¹²⁹⁸

1198. Claeys met with Turatsinze on 10 February. Turatsinze told him how he and the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie had secured the return of a weapon seized from an Interahamwe.¹²⁹⁹ UNAMIR never attempted to verify this information with the chief of staff, although Colonel Marchal was in daily contact with him.¹³⁰⁰

1199. Turatsinze also spoke of an impending raid on the communal office at Butumwa to recover a weapon seized from an Interahamwe. To Claeys knowledge, no such raid ever took place.¹³⁰¹ UNAMIR never warned the bourgmestre of Butumwa.¹³⁰²

¹²⁹⁴ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 25
¹²⁹⁵ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 26
¹²⁹⁶ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 74
¹²⁹⁷ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 28; Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75
¹²⁹⁸ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 74
¹²⁹⁹ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 32
¹³⁰⁰ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75
¹³⁰¹ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 33; Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75

1200. Turatsinze also claimed that the Interahamwe were trained by Israelis in the forests.¹³⁰³ Although Israel was a member of the UN, Claeys never confirmed that Israel had ever trained people in Rwanda.¹³⁰⁴ Turatsinze also claimed that the Interahamwe were responsible for the attack on RPF Major Karenzi.¹³⁰⁵

1201. Turatsinze told him on 17 February that the French had been training Zaireans in the Gishwati forest in Rwanda. Claeys never verified this with the French.¹³⁰⁶

1202. Claeys was told by the RPF liason officer, Colonel Karenzi, that he understood that UNAMIR was infiltrating the Interahamwe. From this, Claeys assumed that perhaps Turatsinze had approached the RPF since UNAMIR had not been able to provide him the guarantees he had sought.¹³⁰⁷ He believed that Turatsinze may have been shopping his information to the RPF.¹³⁰⁸

1203. The information they did have from other sources related to military training and distribution of weapons to Interahamwe. They did not have any other information concerning the extermination of Tutsis.¹³⁰⁹

ii. Witness G

1204. Witness G testified that Jean Pierre Turatsinze was an MRND driver.¹³¹⁰ He was not all that honest, since he had stolen weapons from MRND and sold them to

¹³⁰² Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75
¹³⁰³ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 33
¹³⁰⁴ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75-76
¹³⁰⁵ Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 34
¹³⁰⁶ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 76
¹³⁰⁷ Transcript of 23 November 2006 @ 47
¹³⁰⁸ Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23
¹³⁰⁹ Transcript of 28 November 2006 @ 60
¹³¹⁰ Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 53

FRODEBU.¹³¹¹ He disappeared after the sale of these weapons between October and December 1993 and was not seen again.¹³¹²

1205. Contrary to what was said in the UNAMIR Coded Cable of 11 January 1994, Turatsinze was never in charge of any MRND demonstrations.¹³¹³ He knew of no plans of the MRND to provoke a civil war with the RPF battalion, to assassinate opposition leaders at the swearing-in of the transitional government, or to provoke and kill Belgian soldiers.¹³¹⁴ He was not paid 150,000 RWF per month by MRND, which was more than the salary of a Minister or even perhaps the President of the Republic.¹³¹⁵ He was also unaware of any link between Turatsinze and the Chief of Staff of the Army.¹³¹⁶

1206. It was not true that the Interahamwe were to protect Kigali from the RPF. They were trained only to protect MRND officials. There were no lists of Tutsis drawn up by the Interahamwe, as claimed by Turatsinze. He was not aware of any training of Interahamwe to kill up to 1000 Tutsis in 20 minutes.¹³¹⁷

iii. Witness UB

1207. Although he had several conversations with Turatsinze about distribution of weapons, Turatsinze never told him of a plan to kill Belgian soldiers so that the Belgians would withdraw from Rwanda.¹³¹⁸ He was not aware that Turatsinze had worked in the office of the Presidency.¹³¹⁹

¹³¹¹ Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 53

¹³¹² Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 53-54; Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 2

¹³¹³ Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 4; Exhibit #DNZ-15B

¹³¹⁴ Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 4; Exhibit #DNZ-15B

¹³¹⁵ Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 5; Exhibit #DNZ-15B

¹³¹⁶ Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 5; Exhibit #DNZ-15B

¹³¹⁷ Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 5; Exhibit #DNZ-15B

¹³¹⁸ Transcript of 2 March 2006 @ 41

¹³¹⁹ Transcript of 2 March 2006 @ 41

iv. Witness T

1208. Witness T testified that the Interahamwe never received any instructions from the MRND to provoke Belgian soldiers.¹³²⁰

1209. Witness T believes the FAX of 11 January 1994 is a manipulation. The figure of 1700 Interahamwe having been trained is an overestimate—probably double the actual figure. And the claim that Tutsis could be killed at a rate of 1000 in 20 minutes was “too good to be true” and may well have been created after the April events, not on 11 January.¹³²¹

1210. Witness T was not aware that Turatsinze had ever worked for the presidency, as claimed in the FAX. It was not possible that Turatsinze was being paid RWF150,000 per month to train Interahamwe.¹³²² He was unaware of any order to register all Tutsis in Kigali, or that 1000 Tutsis were to be killed in 20 minutes.¹³²³ Witness T was unaware of any lists of Tutsis compiled by Interahamwe.¹³²⁴ Witness T never saw any weapons stockpiled anywhere.¹³²⁵

v. Witness HH

1211. Witness HH testified that Turatsinze never admitted to him that he was involved in arms trafficking to FRODEBU. He simply said that others were saying that. He later got the proof that he had in fact sold the weapons.¹³²⁶ This meant to him that Turatsinze could not be trusted.¹³²⁷

b. Defence evidence

¹³²⁰ Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 45
¹³²¹ Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 32-33; Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 51
¹³²² Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 52-53
¹³²³ Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 53
¹³²⁴ Transcript of 7 June 2006 @ 19
¹³²⁵ Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 4
¹³²⁶ Transcript of 13 November 2006 @ 12
¹³²⁷ Transcript of 13 November 2006 @ 13

i. Karemera case

1212. **Witness NKM** will testify that he did not believe that Turatsinze's allegations were credible.

1213. **Augustin Ndlindliyimana** will testify that he never ordered the return of a weapon seized from the Interahamwe, or tipped off the MRND to weapons seizures.

ii. Nzirorera case

1214. **Joseph Nzirorera** will testify to Turatsinze's role in the MRND and the fact that Turatsinze's allegations were false. He will explain how he fired Turatsinze for dishonesty.

1215. **Witness 29, Georges Rutaganda, Witness 31, Seraphin Twahirwa, and Witness 36** will testify to Turatsinze's role in the MRND and the fact that Turatsinze's allegations were false.

1216. **Tharcisse Renzaho** will testify that he never lent any vehicle to Turatsinze.

1217. **Luc Marchal and Faustin Twagiramungu** will testify that he did not believe that Turatsinze's allegations of a plan to exterminate the Tutsis were credible.

4. Sabotage of the Arusha Accords

a. Prosecution evidence

i. Witness UB

1218. Witness UB testified that at a rally at Nyamirambo stadium at the end of 1993, Ngirumpatse said that the MRND would never accept to share power with the Tutsi

saying that the Tutsi had obtained several seats in the government under the Arusha Accords.¹³²⁸

ii. Witness ALG

1219. At a rally at Nyamirambo stadium at the end of 1993, Ngirumpatse said that the MRND would never accept to share power with the Tutsi saying that the Tutsi had obtained several seats in the government under the Arusha Accords.¹³²⁹ Ngirumpatse never called for the elimination of the Tutsis.¹³³⁰

iii. Witness GOB

1220. At the MRND rally in Ruhengeri, President Habyarimana said that the MRND would not accept the Arusha Accords.¹³³¹ The President himself said he was not in agreement with the Arusha Accords. It was a scrap of paper that could not be implemented.¹³³² Ngirumpatse also said the MRND would never accept the Arusha Accords.¹³³³

iv. Witness G

1221. Witness G testified that in May, 1993, Emmanuel Gapyisi of the PSD party was assassinated. Witness G has no knowledge of any involvement of the Interahamwe in that killing.¹³³⁴

1222. In February, 1994, Felicien Gatabazi was assassinated. The Interahamwe was blamed for this, but as far as Witness G knows, they were not responsible for

¹³²⁸ Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 46

¹³²⁹ Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 46

¹³³⁰ Transcript of 3 March 2006@ 21

¹³³¹ Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 43

¹³³² Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 49

¹³³³ Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 49

¹³³⁴ Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 27